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We explore the effect of introducing new workplace practices on the gender gap using a 
unique 1999 survey on work and compensation practices of Danish private sector firms 
merged to a large matched employer-employee database. Self-managed teams, project 
organisation and job rotation schemes are the most widely implemented work practices.   
Wage gains from adopting new workplace practices accrue mainly to hourly paid males and 
salaried females but do not generate large changes in the gender gap in pay at the level of the 
firm. Considering practices individually, however, the gender wage gap among salaried 
workers is significantly reduced in firms which offer job rotation and project organisation, 
while among hourly paid workers the use of quality control circles significantly widens the 
gap in pay between male and female workers. 
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A growing area of research these days focuses on the reorganization of work taking place in 
the modern-day organization, away from a task-specialized structure towards a more task-
integrated organizational structure (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). The new organizational 
structure has introduced work practices such as job rotation and learning across tasks, 
teamwork, decentralization of responsibility and worker participation in decision making.   
The adoption of new work practices has led to a breakdown of traditional occupational 
barriers and the establishment of flatter organizational structures. Moreover, high-
performance work practices are usually accompanied and sustained by performance-based 
pay, giving rise to new payment schemes.   
 
In terms of their adoption, such practices diffused slowly in the decade of the 1970s and 
1980s but began to be widely adopted starting from the early 1990s, and by 1997, 
approximately 71% of U.S. firms had adopted some form of innovative human resource 
management practices (Osterman, 1994; 2000). In Europe considerably fewer employers have 
implemented these practices, see OECD (1999). However, in Scandinavia, including 
Denmark, the new practices have been adopted more frequently than in the rest of Europe. 
 
A great deal of the previous research in this area has focused on the effect of new workplace 
practices on establishment level outcomes such as total labour costs, and firm productivity; 
see Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for a recent survey. Relatively less is known about their 
effects on workers’ wages, and in particular, whether these practices affect groups of workers 
differently.  This is largely due to a lack of micro data on workers matched to firm-level data 
on the adoption of high-performance work practices.  Even when wage outcomes are 
considered, previous studies have assumed that the returns to these practices do not vary by 
gender, race or other group characteristics, the typical outcome under study being total labour 
compensation or average establishment level earnings; a notable exception is Bauer and 
Bender (2000).  In this paper, we consider the effect of new work practices on men and 
women’s wages and test for whether the introduction of innovative human resource 
management practices in recent times has had an impact on the gender wage gap.   
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There are several channels through which new workplace practices may lower the gender gap 
in wages.  First, the breakdown of traditional occupational lines or barriers through quality 
control circles or job rotation gives women an entry in to the design and production side, 
traditionally men’s domain, and allows for learning across tasks and skill accumulation in 
tasks that are more remunerative than traditionally female tasks. Second, decentralization of 
supervisory authority and increased worker participation in decision-making give women 
greater bargaining power and control over wages and working conditions compared to 
hierarchical organizational structures in which supervisory positions are mostly held by men. 
Another mechanism could be that incentive-based pay systems that accompany high-
performance work practices allow for transparency in pay as wages are based on known, 
objective and quantifiable performance criteria, making it easier for women to bargain for 
matching increases or to seek legal recourse in situations where wage discrimination may be 
present. Further, job rotation imparts flexibility in workers’ schedules, allowing women to 
more effectively balance home and work responsibilities, thereby raising their productivity at 
the workplace. Finally, a recent line of experimental enquiry within cognitive and social 
psychology explores whether women have an enhanced ability to multitask or superior 
communicative and collaborative skills (Williams et al., 1991; Rubenstein et al., 2001; 
Hannah and Murachver, 1999; Underwood et al., 1990; 1994). Possessing a relative 
advantage in such skills could make women better matched to meet the demands of the 
modern workplace and thereby raise their value to employers.  
 
There exist a few channels through which new workplace practices could serve to increase 
the gender gap in pay. Because of family responsibilities, women may find it difficult to make 
the needed investments to take full advantage of the new practices. Also, decentralization of 
pay negotiation and incentive-based pay remove centrally-determined wage floors which have 
effectively increased women’s wages relative to men’s. Yet another factor that can boost male 
wages in this context is if (mostly male) supervisors in firms which adopt practices are given 
pay increases by management in exchange for their cooperation in supporting and 
disseminating these practices within their units (Black and Lynch, 2004), i.e. to act as 
facilitators. The overall effect on the gender wage gap is theoretically inconclusive and can 
only be determined by empirical means. Our purpose is therefore to quantify the effect of 
these practices on the wage gap, controlling for other observable human capital and firm 
characteristics that are known to affect wages. 
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By combining a unique 1999 survey of employers in Denmark to register data on their 
employees, we have matched data on a total of 224,262 workers working in 1,387 of the firms 
that were surveyed. Further, the firms that were surveyed were asked to provide information 
on the adoption of innovative work practices as well as new incentive-based pay practices.  
This allows us to estimate the wage impacts of new workplace practices on groups of male 
and female workers and on the gender wage gap within the private sector in Denmark.  
 
In spite of the Danish gender wage gap being one of the lowest in the group of developed 
countries, the female-male wage ratio in Denmark has shown signs of stagnation in the 1980s 
and 1990s at a more or less constant level of 80-88%, depending on the measure of wages 
being employed (straight wages or total compensation, see for example Pedersen and Deding, 
2002).  In recent years, there has even been a slight increase in the pay gap even in the face of 
women improving their qualifications vis-à-vis men (Datta Gupta et al., 2004). A number of 
previous studies have linked women’s relatively lower pay to their over-representation in the 
public sector, which has experienced slower wage growth relative to the private sector in 
recent decades (Rosholm and Smith, 1996; Datta Gupta et al., 2002).  However, a few recent 
studies which have had access to matched data have turned attention to the private sector, 
where the raw male-female gap in pay is considerably larger than the national average, even 
when considering full-time workers only.  Further, even within narrowly defined industry and 
occupation groupings, Datta Gupta and Rothstein (forthcoming) and Deding and Wong 
(2004) find a significant unexplained gap exists even after controlling for standard human 
capital characteristics.  Thus, the potential exists for finding alternative explanations for the 
private sector gender wage gap in Denmark.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II yields a brief review of the earlier 
literature. In the next sections we discuss some methodological issues and describe the data at 
our disposal. The fifth and the sixth sections give the empirical model and the empirical 
estimates, respectively. Section VII concludes.  
 
 
II. Previous Research  
 
Only a few previous studies have had access to data on work practices at the individual or 
firm level.  A study on the relationship between workplace innovations and wages by Black 
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and Lynch (2000) match plant level practices with plant level productivity and average 
establishment wages and estimate production functions and wage functions using both cross-
sectional and longitudinal data drawn from a survey of U.S. establishments from 1993 and 
1996.  The study finds that the reorganization of workplaces to incorporate high performance 
work practices leads to an increase in average establishment wages of about 6%.  But, at the 
same time, profit sharing and/or stock options lead to lower regular pay for workers, 
particularly technical and clerical/sales workers.  Their study is based on a sample size of 766 
establishments in 1996 (cross-section) and 193 establishments in the panel (1993-1996).   
Further, the sample is limited to the manufacturing sector only and therefore not necessarily 
representative of the economy as a whole.   
 
Cappelli and Neumark (2001) use a national probability sample of establishments that 
includes comparable measures of performance and work practices across organizations and 
are able to, by virtue of its longitudinal design, incorporate data stemming from a period 
preceding the introduction of these practices.  This allows them to purge their estimates for 
firm or establishment level heterogeneity that may arise due to high-performing firms having 
a greater ability to adopt such practices (“best practices”).  Their findings point to higher labor 
costs per employee and therefore increased employee compensation from adopting these 
practices but weak productivity effects so that the overall effect on profitability is 
inconclusive. 
 
Caroli and van Reenen (2001) study organisational changes, which imply a delayering of 
work organisations in a panel of French firms. They find that these changes had a positive 
impact on productivity. In addition, they find that the new work practices were biased against 
unskilled labour. 
 
A paper by Bailey, Berg and Sandy (2001) examines the relationship between high 
performance work systems (HPWS) and earnings of 4,000 management employees in 45 
establishments in the steel, apparel and medical electronics and imaging industries in the 
period 1995-97. They find that, except in the case of medical electronics, management 
workers employed in workplaces in industries that have more high-performance practices do 
earn more than those in traditional workplaces, after controlling for gender, race, education, 
experience and tenure.  The lack of an effect in the medical industries probably reflects the 
importance of formal qualifications and education for pay in that industry.     
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We are aware of only a few micro studies examining the question of whether workplace 
practices can explain a significant part of the gender wage gap.  Drolet (2002) using matched 
employer-employee data on 24,302 workers from the 1999 Canadian Workplace and 
Employee Survey find that without industry and occupation, workplace characteristics 
account for 27.9% and worker characteristics for 10.8% of the pay gap.  However, the largest 
contributor of workplace characteristics is the workplace part-time rate, which alone accounts 
for 17.7% of the pay gap. In terms of measures of high-performance workplace practices, 
Drolet (2002) has access to two measures, which are whether or not the worker participates in 
self-directed workgroups and whether or not the worker receives performance-based pay.   
These two variables account for 2.5% and 2.3% of the pay gap when occupation and industry 
are not included, and 2.1% and 2.2% when they are included.   When occupation and industry 
are included, respectively, in worker and workplace characteristics the part of the pay gap 
explained by these components increases to 18.6% and 42.6%.  Thus, while overall 61.2% of 
the gender wage gap is explained in this study, the contribution of the two new workplace 
practice measures is minor and the largest single contributing factor explaining gender 
differences in pay between men and women in Canada appears to be industry. 
 
Another recent paper by Garcia et al. (2002) investigates the relationship between job 
characteristics and the gender wage gap using data from a Spanish survey from1991. They 
estimate the effect of individual and job characteristics on male and female wages, after 
controlling for selection due to participation and occupational choice.  In terms of job 
characteristics they distinguish between 5 types of measures. These   relate respectively to the 
degree of worker autonomy in the workplace, the degree of control by others over the 
worker’s output, the degree of supervisory power over other employees, the power to decide 
on issues related to other employees and the degree of educational mismatch.  Their results 
show that taking into account these types of “job quality” measures can explain a fraction of 
the wage gap that would otherwise have been attributed to discrimination.  Still, a substantial 
portion of the wage gap (81%) remains unexplained in Spain.   
 
Two previous Danish studies have used matched employer-employee data to study the effect 
of firm and job level factors on the gender wage gap. 
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Lausten (2001) examines the gender earnings gap at the executive level using a data set of 
Danish executives in the period 1992-1995.  Findings show that the gender wage gap among 
Danish executives is explained by individual, job, occupation and industry differences. In 
terms of job characteristics, there is information on CEO status, headship of division, an index 
of the level of authority held and board membership. Decomposition of wage equations into 
inter- and intra-occupational differences shows that two thirds of the wage gap of executives 
is due to differences between occupations, while individual-specific characteristics contribute 
negatively, i.e. in favour of female executives.  The gender wage gap among executives is 
found to be strongly influenced by the real level of authority.   
 
Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001) use matched employer-employee cross-sectional data from 
1983 and 1995 for full-time private sector workers in Denmark to examine how segregation 
of women by occupation, industry, establishment and job cells impacts the male-female wage 
differential. For both salaried and manual workers, job cells are found to be the most 
segregated, followed by occupation, while segregation is less evident at the industry and 
establishment levels. Based on fixed effects wage regressions, they find that occupation 
differences account for much of the wage gap between male and female salaried, but not 
manual employees in Denmark. Second, differences in actual experience, industry, and 
establishment explain much of the gender wage differential for manual, but not salaried 
employees.  And finally, even in the fullest specification, which includes human capital 
characteristics and job-cell fixed effects, both salaried and manual male and female 
employees earn different wages within job cells. 
 
None of these previous studies has, however, been able to examine the effect of a wide array 
of high performance work practices on male and female wages for an adequately large sample 
of establishments spanning a relatively long period.  By having access to an unique survey of 
the extent of adoption of new work practices among firms in Denmark matched to a large 
employer-employee data base, our is the first study to be able to quantify the impact of a 
number of practices on the wages of male and female employees within the firm, controlling 
for other firm-level characteristics. 
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III. Methodological Issues 
 
Two methodological issues present themselves in the estimation of wage models accounting 
for new work place practices.  First, more productive workers self-select into jobs 
characterized by high-performance work practices or where pay is tied to performance (see 
for example Parent, 1999; Lazear, 2000). While this type of selection may bias the return to 
practices upwards in a wage regression, it will in general have no consequences for the male-
female gap in pay unless there is differential self-selection by males and females to firms 
offering workplace practices.  We shed some light on this type of selection and its 
consequences for the gender wage gap in Section VI.   
 
The other type of selection that potentially occurs is that firms that face the threat of closure 
may be the ones most likely to adopt such practices or due to “best practices”. Thus, there is a 
need to measure performance before these practices are introduced, (see for example Cappelli 
and Neumark, 2001).  As the sample period in the current analysis spans the period 1992 to 
2000, and as on average a fifth of the firms had adopted a practice already in the 1980s, a 
relatively large number of firms in the sample are observed before the adoption of such 
practices, allowing us to control for this type of heterogeneity. 
 
 
IV. Data Description 
 
The analysis uses a data set on Danish private sector firms with more than 20 employees, 
which has been constructed by merging information from two sources. The first source is a 
questionnaire directed at firms that contains information about their work and compensation 
practices. The other is a longitudinal employer-employee data set
1 that provides information 
about firm characteristics and performance as well as about the firms’ employees. 
 
The survey was administered by Statistics Denmark as a mail questionnaire survey in May 
and June 1999, which was sent out to 3,200 private sector firms with more than 20 
employees. The firms were chosen from a random sample, stratified according to size (as 
measured by the number of full time employees) and industry. The survey over-sampled large 
                                                 
1  See www.ccp.asb.dk for a more detailed description.  
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and medium-sized firms: all firms with 50 employees or more were included, and 35 per cent 
of firms in the 20-49 employees range. The response rate was 51 per cent, which is relatively 
high for a rather long and detailed questionnaire of the type that was used.
2  
 
The survey represents a unique source of information on Danish firms’ internal labour 
markets and changes therein. Besides some background information about the firm, the firm 
was asked about its work organisation, compensation systems, recruitment, internal training 
practices and how it evaluates its employees. For a brief description of the questionnaire and 
the main results (in Danish), see Eriksson et al. (2000).  
 
Owing to the high response rate, the survey provides us with 1,605 useful observations. For 
the questions concerning work design and practices, the firms were asked to differentiate 
between hourly paid and salaried employees.  
 
Using unique firm identification numbers within Statistics Denmark, the survey data were 
supplemented with information about the firms as well as about their workforces. This 
information is taken from a large employer-employee linked database, which covers all 
private sector firms and all the employees who worked in them (in Denmark) in any year 
during the period 1980 to 2000.
3 The panel contains detailed information about employee 
characteristics
4 (and hence, firms’ workforces in any year) and about their labour earnings and 
other income. In addition, the panel has economic information about the firms, with 20 or 
more full-time equivalent employees, for the years 1992 to 2000. 
 
Firms’ use of work (and pay) practices can be measured along several dimensions. The 
measure adopted in the survey questionnaire is whether a firm has implemented one of six 
work designs:  
(i) Self-managed teams. Self-managed teams is a work organization which gives its members 
authority over decisions regarding how to perform tasks or even, which tasks to perform. 
                                                 
2  The response rates for the size and one-digit industry cells vary only little: between 47 and 53 per cent. Thus, 
the representativeness of the sample is of no major concern. 
3 The important feature of the panel is the link between firms and employees, which is consistent over time. The 
data originate from two separate registers maintained by Statistics Denmark: the integrated database for labour 
market research (IDA) and the business statistics database (BSD). 
 
4  Worker characteristics at the person-year level include gender, age, ongoing tenure, and level and years of 
education. 
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Important aspects of team working is pooling of skills and skills development of individual 
workers. 
(ii) Job rotation. Job rotation is a system where the workers are explicitly required to rotate 
between different jobs. This increases the variety of tasks to be performed by the employee 
and is also likely to enhance the employee’s understanding of the operation.  
(iii) Quality circles. Groups of workers who meet regularly to solve problems concerning 
productivity and people and to discuss aspects of performance and quality. 
(iv) Total quality management (TQM); an important element is that TQM programmes, of 
which ISO9000 probably is the best known, include employee involvement. 
(v) Benchmarking. Benchmarking is a formal system of learning about practices in other firms 
and organisations.  
(vi) Project organisation. Groups of workers are organised in projects with defined targets, 
timetables, budgets and frequently considerable authority with respect to how to perform 
tasks. 
 
It is important to note that the firms were also asked about when each work practice (if any) 
was adopted. However, one important piece of information we do not have regarding the 
implementation of the practices is the proportion of employees affected by the particular work 
designs.
5 Nor were the respondents asked to rank the practices according to some notion of 
their importance. The firms were also asked a corresponding question regarding the 
implementation of performance related pay (PRP) practices. More precisely the firms were 
asked whether they had adopted one of four PRP methods – team bonus, individual bonus, 
stock and stock options and profit sharing – for four different categories of employees: top 
managers, middle-management, other white collar workers and blue collar workers; see 
Eriksson (2001), for details. Unlike for the work practices, the firms were unfortunately not 
asked about when they had implemented the different pay practices. The questionnaire only 
asked the firms whether they had made considerable changes in their payment systems in 
recent years, without being more specific as to when or to which payment system. 
 
                                                 
5  If seems plausible to assume that the higher the number of practices used, the larger is  the proportion of 
workers in the firm involved in some of the new work practices. Thus, the number of practices implemented can 
serve as a proxy for coverage.  
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Table 1 gives some information on the firms that have and have not adopted the new work 
organisations, respectively, by each work practice in year 1998.
6  Table 2 provides 
corresponding information regarding new pay practices. From Table 1 we may note that the 
most widely implemented new work practices are self-managed teams, project organisation 
and job rotation schemes. These numbers refer to the percentage of firms that have or have 
not adopted the practices. Corresponding shares of employees working in firms that have or 
have not introduced the practices are found in Table 3. As larger firms are substantially more 
likely to have adopted new work or pay practices (see Eriksson, 2001), the proportion of 
workers in firms with them is larger than the share of firms that have them. 
 
Since the questionnaire was only sent out to private sector firms with 20 or more full-time 
employees, the (unweighted) average proportion of women in the firms ─ 28.3 per cent ─ is 
considerably lower than in the whole Danish labour force, in which females make up about 
fifty per cent. It can, moreover, be seen that firms that have adopted NWPs have on average a 
larger proportion of female employees than other firms. 
 
So, female employees are more likely to work in a firm with one or more of the new work 
practices. The average firm wage for women is, however, higher in firms which have not 
adopted the new practices, save firms with TQM where wages are roughly the same as in 
those without TQM, and project organisation where women earn less in firms without this 
practice. For male workers there is a similar pattern, except again for project organisation, and 
for firms with and without teams, where men are on average paid the same hourly wage. The 
“raw” firm level gender gap is slightly smaller in firms that have introduced job rotation, 
quality circles and TQM than in those without, whereas the gap is clearly larger in firms that 
have adopted teams and in particular, project organisations. 
 
Turning to Table 2, according to which every second firm has the so called qualification pay 
system – a formalised wage setting system, where extra pay is given an employee based on 
her qualifications such as education, experience of a certain job or tasks, skills acquired 
through on-the-job training, etc. – and 25-30 per cent have team or individual bonuses, we 
may, to begin with, notice that the proportion of females is the same in firms with and without 
                                                 
6 Other distinguishing characteristics of firms that have adopted the new work practices are that they are in the 
manufacturing and financial services sectors, foreign owned, have a higher share of educated employees and use 
performance pay systems. For details, see Eriksson (2001). 
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the performance related pay systems, save stock and stock options where there are more 
women working in firms that have them, and profit schemes that are more common in firms 
with relatively more female workers. For both genders we observe the following pattern: with 
the exception for qualification pay, the average wage is higher in firms without the new pay 
practices than in those which have introduced them, and the differences are typically quite 
large. The pattern is rather peculiar as the qualification pay system is supposed to tie wages to 
qualifications and hence reduce differentials for other reasons, whereas the other payment 
schemes do not have that type of goals. As for the firm gender gaps, they are smaller in firms 
with a qualification pay system, whereas they are larger in firms with bonus systems, stock 
and stock option schemes and profit sharing schemes. 
 
Of course, all the wage differences in Tables 1 and 2 may be due to differences in the 
composition and skills structures of the workforces in firms with and without the new work 
and pay schemes. In particular, the relatively large differentials between adopters and non-
adopters of new pay practices may reflect the sorting effect (see Lazear, 2000) ─ that pay 
systems rewarding for good performance attract the best workers. The similarity of patterns 
for both genders also suggests that there are a number of factors we have not yet considered 
that give rise to differences in pay between adopters and non-adopters of different work and 
pay practices. In the following section we will, therefore, carry out analyses that aim at 
controlling for these differences as well as accounting for when and which of the different 
work practices were implemented in the firms.  
 
V. Empirical Model 
   
The dependent variable in the analysis is the log of hourly wages, where wages are deflated 
by the consumer price index. More specifically, we compute for each firm and year, (i) the 
average hourly wage separately for females and males, and (ii) the gender wage differential. 
Differences in the average firm wages reflect of course differences in the composition of the 
firms’ workforces with respect to age, education and other both human capital variables. As 
the firms’ workforce structures typically change only slowly, we do not enter these as 
explanatory variables in the estimations but capture them by using firm fixed effects and firm-
specific trends. 
 
Thus, log hourly wages for sex group i in firm j at time t is given by: 
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ijt jt i t j j t i j i j t j i ijt NWP T F T S F S T F S LogW ε δ β β β α α α + + × + × + × + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 ….(1) 
 
where Si indicates sex group i, Fj is an indicator for the firm, T indicates the time period and 
NWPjt is an indicator for new workplace practices, the dependent variable of interest. Note 
that the NWP indicator which we will operationalise in alternative ways, is a time-varying 
variable. Thus, the indicator captures the effect of introducing a specific or one additional new 
work practice in the firm. An advantage of observing firms before they introduce NWP is that 
we can purge the estimates for some firm-level heterogeneity that arises because of the “best 
practices” effect. 
 
The gender gap in wages can be written as 
 
fjt mjt
jt f m t f m j f m j f m fjt mjt NWP T S S F S S S S LogW LogW
ε ε
δ δ β β α
− +
− + − + − + − = − ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 1
     (2) 
or, 
jt jt t j j jt dNWP T b F b a LogW ε + + + + = ∆ 2 1           ( 3 )  
 
The assumption in the model in (3) that there is a common time trend for all firms seems 
unnecessarily restrictive and so, we try with substituting it with firm-specific time trends, 
purging the data of all observed and unobserved time invariant firm-specific effects, including 
any bias that might arise if within-firm changes in work practices are correlated with time-
varying unobservables that affect male and female wages differently. The NWP indicator is 
entered in three different ways. First, we use a simple dummy for whether or not the firm has 
adopted at least one of the new work practices. This is of course a very crude measure. Our 
second measure is the number of new work practices, which informs us about the marginal 
effect of additional work practices.  This measure allows for synergies arising from bundling 
practices together, without either arbitrarily grouping practices ex ante or selecting those 
groupings that best fit the data ex post. The third operationalisation is including the individual 
work practices. We run the equations separately for female wages, male wages and the gender 
differential. A small number of the firms have either very few (less than 5) male or female 
employees, and for these observations the firm gender wage gap measure is rather 
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meaningless. We have therefore, omitted the firms with less than five male or female 
employees from the estimation sample. 
 
VI. Estimation Results 
 
Let us to begin with consider the simplest version of the NWP indicator: at least one practice, 
the estimates of which are collected in Table 4. We can see that there are positive (3-4 per 
cent) and significant estimates for both male and female hourly paid employees and men in 
salaried employment. As the wage gains are about the same size for both men and women, the 
gender differential is not affected by the introduction of new work practices, measured in this 
admittedly very crude manner. 
 
Turning next to Table 5, where the number of practices is used as the NWP indicator, we may 
observe that the firm average wage for hourly paid males is increasing in the number of 
practices adopted up to 4 after which the estimates still increase but become insignificant. It 
should be noted, however, that the estimates for five or six practices are based on very few 
observations. The wage of female hourly paid workers is significantly higher in firms that 
have implemented one practice. As for men, the wage increases with additional practices, but 
the estimates do not differ significantly from zero. The firm level gender gap estimates carry 
relatively large standard errors, and do not differ statistically from zero.  
 
Interestingly, for salaried employees we observe an opposite pattern. Here, female employees’ 
wages are increasing in the number of new work practices adopted, whereas for men only the 
first new practice implemented gives rise to an increase in their wages. Thus, it seems as the 
gains from the introduction of new work practices accrue mainly to hourly paid males and 
salaried females. Moreover, firms, which adopt bundles of new work practices are paying 
their employees more. The wage gains are not, however, large enough to generate changes in 
gender wage differentials at the level of the firms. One observation from Table 5 worth 
making is that the majority of the estimates for the hourly paid workers are positive, whilst for 
the salaried employees most of them are negative. 
 
Table 6 gathers the results from regressions with all the individual practices included. Not 
many of the estimates differ statistically from zero. This may in part be because they are 
adopted in bundles. At any rate, TQM has a quite strong positive effect on both male and 
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female wages. The magnitude, 7-12 per cent, is relatively large, especially in a labour market 
like the Danish one, which is characterised by an internationally very compressed wage 
structure. The impacts of most the practices on the gender gap are positive for the hourly paid 
workers, albeit not significant. For the salaried employees, the impacts are more varied, 
although they are mainly negative for the commonly adopted practices. The gender gap 
estimate for project organisations is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.  
 
In  Tables A-1 to A-6 in the appendix, the results from regressions in which we enter 
individual practices one by one are presented. Because the results for the number of practices 
indicate that bundles matter, we should not expect to dovetail many effects from these 
estimations.
7 And, indeed we do not. Hourly paid men in firms with project organisations earn 
a wage premium, whereas female workers on hourly pay in firms with quality circles are paid 
7.5 % less than in firm without. For workers paid on an hourly basis, the gender gap is larger 
in firms with quality circles and the rarely used benchmarking schemes. In no case is the gap 
reduced. 
   
The picture differs somewhat for the salaried employees: both men and women working in 
firms that introduce TQM receive a higher wage. The difference with respect to those who do 
not is again quite large. Regarding the gender wage differences, we find three practices to 
reduce the gap: job rotation schemes, project organisations and total quality management. The 
last effect is not statistically significant, though.  
 
Summing up, also the estimates from including the practices separately one at a time into 
equation (1) yield some additional support to our earlier findings in that the introduction of 
new work practices in firms, widens the gender wage gap for hourly paid workers, but reduces 
it for the salaried workers.  
 
Do the above estimates measure the true productivity-enhancing impact of workplace 
practices or do they merely reflect the fact that firms that introduce such practices are able to 
attract more productive workers? And, if so, is there differential selection across men and 
women to such firms?  We examine this question in a rather simple way by re-estimating the 
model with the simplest version of the NWP indicator – at least one practice – on the group of 
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incumbents only, i.e. workers who were employed in the firm before the practices were 
introduced and who remained in the firm afterwards.  That is, new entrants who joined the 
firm after the adoption of such practices are not included in the estimation.  Neither do we 
include employees who leave the firm following the introduction of work practices.  Although 
this is a simplistic way of exploring the selection issue, the effect on wages of the self-
selection of more able workers to the firm is likely underestimated as the less able most likely 
leave the firm following the introduction of new practices requiring some degree of worker 
investment.   
 
Table 7 presents the results of this estimation.  Compared to Table 4, wage effects of NWP 
are smaller and never significant, although t-ratios greater than 1 are obtained in the case of 
male and female hourly paid workers and male salaried workers.  For these groups, the wage 
effects are roughly two-thirds the size of those obtained previously in Table 4.  Thus, some 
part of the size and significance of the impacts on workers’ wages of new practices seen in 
Table 4 are a result of worker sorting by ability. This seems to be especially pronounced in 
the case of female salaried workers, for whom incumbents receive almost no wage gains from 
practices.  However, in no case are the results for the gender wage gap different from those 
found in Table 4.  Of course, one caveat is that this “sorting effect” may arise due to 
workplace practices enhancing the productivity of entrants more than incumbents. But it is 
difficult to conceive why this may be the case.  Hence, the overall conclusion from this 
exercise seems to be that both productivity enhancing effects and sorting effects seem to be 
present and it is not necessary to try to portion out the separate contributions of each, as these 




This paper investigates the effect of new workplace practices on the gender wage gap by 
combining information on the adoption of an array of workplace practices obtained from a 
unique survey on firms to matched panel data on the population of workers within these firms.  
Thus, this is one of few studies to explore the issue of whether such practices impact groups 
of workers within firm differently, in contrast to the previous literature that is largely focused 
on establishment-wide earnings outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 For example, firms with TQM have often introduced quality circles, too. Consequently, when entering them 
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We find that the most widely implemented work practices in the private sector in Denmark 
are self-managed teams, project organisation and job rotation schemes.  In terms of groups of 
workers who most benefit from these schemes, we find that the wage gains from introduction 
of new workplace practices seem to accrue mainly to hourly paid males and salaried females, 
but that these gains are not sufficiently large to generate large changes in the gender gap in 
pay at the level of the firm.   
 
Still, when considering individual work practices, we find that the introduction of such work 
practices in firms in general seems to widen the gender wage gap for hourly paid workers and 
reduce it for the salaried workers after purging the estimates of all observed and unobserved 
time-invariant firm-specific factors and a firm-specific time trend.  For hourly paid workers, 
the pay gap significantly increases in firms with quality circles and benchmarking while for 
salaried employees it is reduced significantly through adoption of practices such as job 
rotation and project organisation.  Further, it can be seen that it is female salaried employees 
who benefit particularly from job rotation schemes and project organisation. This may 
indicate that in part, females in salaried jobs benefit from the increased learning across tasks, 
variation in responsibility and the greater authority and control over task definition and 
planning implied by such practices, and these factors raise their relative wages.  On the other 
hand, female hourly wage employees who typically have a weaker attachment to the labour 
force are potentially not able to take advantage of these practices and are found to face a 
relative wage disadvantage from schemes such as quality circles, which may impose time 
demands that are difficult to accord with family responsibilities.  We also provide (indirect) 
evidence that firms that offer new workplace practices in part tend to attract better quality 
workers by comparing wage effects of working in a firm with at least one practice arising 
over all workers in the firm to those arising within incumbents only.  Particularly in the case 
of female salaried workers, it seems that the wage gain from being employed in a firm with at 
least one high performance practice is largely driven by the higher wages of (presumably) 




                                                                                                                                                          
one by one into the regressions, the results may differ from those where are both present. 
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Table 1. Some characteristics of adopters and non-adopters of new work practices.  
 
Work practice:  Teams  Teams  Job rot. Job rot. Q. circles  Q. circles 
Has adopted:  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Prop. of firms  77.5  22.5  87.3  12.7  97.2  2.8 
Prop. of women  
in firm 
27.2 32.0 27.3  35.4  28.3  30.1 
Av.  wage  females 140.54 137.46 140.43  135.89  140.00  134.75 
Av.  wage  males  178.41 178.64 179.11  174.02  178.63  172.67 




Work  practice:  TQM TQM Proj.org. Proj.  org. Benchmk.  Benchmk. 
Has adopted:  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Prop. of firms  94.1  5.9  86.1  13.9  96.2  3.8 
Prop. of women 
in firm 
28.3 28.7 28.2  28.8  28.04  34.63 
Av.  wage  females 139.87 139.50 139.11  144.6  139.60  145.66 
Av.  wage  males  178.60 176.23 176.07  193.23  177.84  193.05 
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Table 2. Some characteristics of adopters and non-adopters of new pay practices.  
 












Has adopted:  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Prop. of firms  74.9  25.1  70.8  29.2  95.7  4.3 
Prop. of women  
In firm 
28.1 28.8 27.8  29.6  28.0  36.0 
Av.  wage  females 139.74 140.17 138.01  144.28  139.10  156.27 
Av.  wage  males  177.35 181.77 173.53  190.46  176.23  227.99 
Raw gender gap  37.82  41.79  35.72  46.34  37.33  71.72 
 








Has adopted:  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Prop. of firms  89.3  10.7  48.9  51.1 
Prop. of women 
In firm 
28.7 25.4 28.2  28.4 
Av. wage females  139.03  146.69  141.31  138.45 
Av.  wage  males  177.19 189.04 181.97  175.09 
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Table 3. The share of employees in firms with new work and pay practices by practice and 
gender. 
 
Percentage of employees  
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aFirm fixed effects and firm-specific time trends were included as additional controls. 
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Table 5. The impact of the number of new work practices on firm average wage by gender 
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hourly 
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Table 6. The impact of different work practices on firm average wage by gender and the 
gender gap
a 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1. Estimations of equation (1) for firm male wages 
Dep. var.: log male hourly wage 
Teams 0.010 
(0.009) 
     
Job rotation    0.010 
(0.012) 
    
Quality  circles    -0.019 
(0.028) 
   
Total quality 
Management 
   0.007 
(0.017) 
  









Table A-2. Estimations of equation (1) for firm female wages 
Dep. var.: log female hourly wage 
Teams 0.015 
(0.010) 
      
Job rotation    0.005 
(0.013) 
     
Quality  circles    -0.075*** 
(0.031) 
   
Total quality 
management 
    0.023 
(0.019) 
  





      0.005 
(0.014) 
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Table A-3. Estimation of equation (3) for firm gender gaps 
Dep. var.: gender hourly log wage gap 
Teams -0.005 
(0.011) 
     
Job rotation    0.005 
(0.014) 
    
Quality  circles    0.056* 
(0.033) 
   
Total quality 
Management 
   -0.016 
(0.020) 
  










Table A-4. Estimations of equation (1) for firm male wages, salaried employees 
Dep. var.: log male hourly wage 
Teams 0.016 
(0.018) 
     
Job rotation    -0.007 
(0.022) 
    
Quality  circles    0.031 
(0.058) 
   
Total quality 
Management 
   0.071** 
(0.033) 
  





     -0.020 
(0.025) 
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Table A-5. Estimations of equation (1) for firm female wages, salaried employees 
Dep. var.: log female hourly wage 
Teams 0.003 
(0.017) 
        
Job rotation    0.030 
(0.021) 
     
Quality  circles    -0.034 
(0.055) 
    
Total quality 
Management 
    0.121*** 
(0.031) 
  









Table A-6. Estimation of equation (3) for firm gender gaps, salaried employees 
Dep. var.: gender hourly log wage gap 
Teams 0.013 
(0.018) 
     
Job rotation    -0.037* 
(0.022) 
    
Quality  circles    0.065 
(0.059) 
   
Total quality 
Management 
   -0.049 
(0.034) 
  





     -0.046* 
(0.026) 
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